Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal by Yang, Tongxuan (Stella) & Mitchell, Olivia S
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council
1-1-2005
Public Pension Governance, Funding, and
Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, TONGXUAN@WHARTON.UPENN.EDU
Olivia S. Mitchell
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/376
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Yang, Tongxuan (Stella) and Mitchell, Olivia S., "Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal"
(2005). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 376.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/376
Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance: A Longitudinal
Appraisal
Abstract
Pension plans covering US public sector employees now face the twin challenges of poor asset returns and
rapid increases in liabilities, producing the worst pension funding outcomes in decades. This paper explores
how public pension plan investment performance and funding is related to several structural and pension
design features. Using a new longitudinal dataset on state and local public pension plans, we evaluate how
investment performance is tied to stock funding ratios and how stock funding ratio in turn affects flow funding
efforts. We find that particular governance structures can enhance public pension plan investment
performance and funding status, and we suggest ways in which public plan design might be improved.
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/376
 
Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance:  
A Longitudinal Appraisal   
 
 
 
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
 
 
PRC WP 2005-2 
 
 
Pension Research Council Working Paper 
 
Pension Research Council 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 
Tel: 215.898.7620 Fax: 215.898.0310 
Email: prc@wharton.upenn.edu 
http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/prc.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yang is a doctoral candidate and Bradley Fellow at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  Mitchell is the 
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans Professor of Insurance and Risk Management; Executive 
Director of the Pension Research Council; and Director of the Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement 
Research, all at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  Funding for this research was provided by 
the Pension Research Council, the Boettner Center, and a Bradley Foundation Fellowship (Yang). Without 
implicating them, we acknowledge helpful assistance and suggestions Chris Allen, Nick Greifer, Robert Inman, Karl 
Johnson, Marie-Eve Lachance, Steven Nesbitt, John Piggott, and Perry Young. Opinions and any errors remain the 
authors’ responsibility.   Yang and Mitchell, 2004. All Rights Reserved. 
 
This paper is to be published in Shortchanged? Pension Fund Governance and Retirement Provision. Ed. John 
Piggott. Edward Elgar. Forthcoming 2005. 
 
Pension Research Council Working Papers are intended to make research findings available to other researchers in 
preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. ©2005 Pension 
Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All Rights Reserved. 
 
  
Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance: 
A Longitudinal Appraisal 
 
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
Abstract 
 
Pension plans covering US public sector employees now face the twin challenges of poor asset 
returns and rapid increases in liabilities, producing the worst pension funding outcomes in 
decades. This paper explores how public pension plan investment performance and funding is 
related to several structural and pension design features. Using a new longitudinal dataset on 
state and local public pension plans, we evaluate how investment performance is tied to stock 
funding ratios and how stock funding ratio in turn affects flow funding efforts. We find that 
particular governance structures can enhance public pension plan investment performance and 
funding status, and we suggest ways in which public plan design might be improved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang (corresponding author) 
Dept of Insurance & Risk Management, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, St. 3000 SH-DH,  
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 
T: 215-898-3589  
E-mail: tongxuan@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell  
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans Professor  
Dept. of Insurance & Risk Management, Wharton School  
3620 Locust Walk, St. 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302  
T: 215-898-0424  
E-mail: mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
 
 Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance:  
A Longitudinal Appraisal   
 
Tongxuan (Stella) Yang and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
 
Public pension plans are the mainstay of retirement security for millions of public sector 
employees plans around the world.  In the US, these plans have traditionally been of the defined 
benefit (DB) variety, holding around $3 trillion in assets (Ilkiw, 2003) and covering a range of 
state and local civil servants, teachers and university professors, uniformed workers (firefighters, 
police). Though these pensions play a key role in US labor and capital markets, analysts and 
taxpayers have devoted relatively little attention to them until recently, when serious funding 
problems emerged due to assets standing well below levels needed to cover promised benefits. 
Recently, over two-thirds of all state pension systems were judged to be underfunded (Nesbitt 
2003), and additional concerns are emerging as equity market declines, paired with low interest 
rates, have attracted media interest.1 A wide variety of stakeholders stands to lose if public 
pension funding ratios sink, including retirees who might suffer benefit cuts, and taxpayers who 
may have to pay for underfinanced benefit claims.2 Such pension liabilities can also reduce 
governments’ ability to attract and retain high-quality employees,3 and underfunding can also 
influence credit ratings, potentially increasing risk premia for public debt.4  
Traditionally, public pension plans have differed from their corporate counterparts in the 
US because state and local pensions are not subject to national regulation shaping their funding 
targets, how they must be managed, what they can invest in, and how they report their 
performance. Rather, each state and many localities structure their Boards according to local 
rules, they set investment and performance targets independently within each jurisdiction, and 
they manage their pensions according to local practice. For this reason, there is a rich variety of 
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experience with alternative governance and reporting structures in the public plan arena that can 
be used to assess the determinants of successful public plan funding.  In this paper we employ a 
newly constructed longitudinal dataset on state and local pensions to evaluate how funding status 
responds to governance structures and investment strategies.  In what follows, we use the 
longitudinal PENDAT file to describe public pension funding patterns over the last decade, along 
with a discussion of investment performance. Next, we construct an empirical model to explore 
the determinants of public pension investment performance and funding. Our results point out 
which governance and disclosure factors are of key interest to policymakers and stakeholders 
seeking to make public plans more resilient in the international arena. 
 
I. An Overview of Public Plan Funding Patterns and Investment Performance 
 Public pension plans in the US have been surveyed approximately biennially by the 
Public Pension Coordinating Council (PPCC) in the last decade. The resulting datafiles, known 
as the “PENDAT surveys,” capture a wide range of public retirement system practices regarding 
plan administration, membership, benefits, contributions, funding, and investments.5  We 
summarize key information gleaned from these surveys in Table 1, which indicates the number 
of state and local plans reporting over time, as well as their asset holdings and liabilities.  
Table 1 here 
The data show, for instance, that state and local plans surveyed held a median $1.7 billion 
in assets in 2000, with reported liabilities of around the same magnitude. The distribution is quite 
skewed, so mean plan assets and liabilities in the sample are on the order of $10 billion. 
Following convention, we define the stock funding ratio as the ratio of assets to the present value 
of vested funded liabilities: that measure stood at approximately 100 percent in 2000. This factor 
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is indicative of whether a pension plan’s assets are sufficient to collateralize promised benefits in 
the long run (Mitchell and Smith, 1994).6  By contrast, the flow funding measure captures the 
ratio of “required” to actual annual contributions in a given year; the evidence shows that these 
plans did meet their annual contribution with a ratio of just over 100 percent.  
Table 1 also shows that reported public pension assets and liabilities grew over time, and 
assets rose more quickly than liabilities. This produced enhanced funding ratios over the decade 
of 1990’s. For instance, stock funding stood at only 86 percent and flow funding at around 89 
percent in 1990, but both measures had risen to around 100 percent by 2000.  Since averages 
conceal substantial diversity, stock funding ratios ranged from 0 to 500 percent in our sample.7  
The top panel of Table 1 also indicates that contributions fell slightly over the period, in response 
to good investment performance.  The lower panel indicates public plan investment performance 
over the last decade. During the decade, managers obtained positive real single year returns in all 
years but one. On the other hand, one-year returns were quite volatile, reaching a high of 13.5 
percent in 1998 and a low of –0.6 percent in 1994; furthermore, cross-sectional standard 
deviations reached 7.8 percent in 1991. Naturally, the five-year average returns are smoother, 
ranging from 5.2 to 11.3 percent, with correspondingly smaller volatility. In what follows, we 
turn to an examination of funding over time and across plans, and we explore how these are 
linked to investment returns and governance factors. 
  
II. Prior Public Pension Research 
Most early studies on public pensions have been of a descriptive and cross-sectional 
nature, so most did not evaluate specific explanations for why some public plans may have 
outperformed others.8   A few analytic works did investigate the determinants of public plan 
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funding outcomes using a single equation cross-section approach, while a smaller set still have 
developed a multi-equation approach to control for possible endogeneity.  For our purposes, the 
outcomes of particular interest in that body of literature are pension funding measures and 
investment returns; control variables include attributes of the plans including governance 
features, mainly board composition, management practices, and reporting practices; and pension 
investment practices, relating to whether the plan had restrictions on specific investment 
categories. We summarize these studies in Table 2.9 
Table 2 here 
As is clear, most previous studies used single-equation models to relate outcomes of 
interest to control variables.  For instance, Inman (1985) linked teacher pension funding patterns 
to environmental variables; he concluded that underfunding was worse in older, more 
industrialized cities, and in poorer rural states. The study by Hsin and Mitchell (1994) also used 
cross-sectional data to evaluate the determinants of public pension plan funding including fiscal 
stress and governance variables; that paper concluded that actuarial assumptions (specifically, 
assumptions about interest rates, wage growth rates, and amortization periods) appeared to be set 
strategically to meet changing fiscal situations. A subsequent analysis (Mitchell and Hsin, 1997) 
also employed cross-sectional data to link both funding and investment performance outcomes to 
governance variables including board composition. That study found that funding was enhanced 
by having in-house actuaries and when pension Board members were required to carry liability 
insurance. Funding was lower when states experienced fiscal stress, and when employees were 
represented on the pension system Board.   
In another single-equation regression study, Mark (1997) employed panel data for 1972-
1991 to explore funding practices across states and over time. That analysis concluded that 
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underfunding was a mean-reverting process, rather than a random walk. He also reported that 
stock market returns and fiscal budget surpluses had positive effects on funding, and more 
frequent actuarial studies caused underfunding to revert more quickly to equilibrium. However 
he did not investigate the role of governance factors, nor did Chaney et al. (2002) who used 
1994-95 data in a single-equation study to revisit the relationship between underfunding and 
fiscal stress as well as state balanced budget restrictions. The latter paper concluded that public 
plan funding was worse when states experienced fiscal stress and when states had mandatory 
balanced budget requirements.  Coronado et al. (2003) explored whether conflicts of interests 
inherent in public pension plans hurt plan investment performance. Employing cross-section 
PENDAT 2000 data, those authors found some evidence that economically targeted investments 
and country/industry restrictions were associated with lower investment returns, and that public 
plans earned a significantly lower rate of return than did private plans.    
Only three prior studies have used multiple-equation models to evaluate public plan 
funding and investment behavior, allowing for the possibility that plan funding may be 
endogenously determined with other plan characteristics. One report, by Inman (1982), was not 
concerned with funding per se; rather, the author investigated whether public pension funding 
affected public employee earnings and labor supply, and also whether taxpayers might flee a 
locality to avoid being taxed to cover unfunded public pension liabilities. Data from 60 large 
U.S. police and firefighter plans for 1970-73 were used to estimate a three-equation model 
determining public employee wages, employment levels, and pensions. That analysis concluded 
that higher wages could offset pension underfunding, and that taxpayer migration might occur to 
avoid public plan underfunding.  A later analysis (Johnson 1997) explored the question of why 
pension plans in the public sector are more generous than in the private sector, using a two-
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equation recursive model. The author showed that the relative generosity of a public pension 
plan was related to the ability to underfund the plan, which in turn was constrained by out-
migration. The third previous multi-equation study, by Mitchell and Smith (1994), analyzed 
interactions between required pension contributions, actual contributions, and public sector wage 
levels.  That research used cross-sectional data from the late 1980s to show that pension funding 
practices tend to be perpetuated over time, and that underfunding grows in times of fiscal 
pressure.  
To summarize, then, the majority of prior public pension studies did not focus mainly on 
funding and investment performance. Those that did tended to confirm, using single-equation 
models, that public plan funding and investment performance were influenced by governance 
and investment practice factors. Nevertheless, prior studies did not take into account the 
possibility that plan funding and investment performance may be endogenously determined, and 
that funding results in one year may be related to lagged funding measures. In what follows, we 
explore both possibilities using a new panel data set from PENDAT.   
 
III. Methodology   
We build on previous research on public plans in two ways. First, our focus is on public 
plan funding and investment performance, using a decade of data on US public pension plans. 
Except for Mitchell and Smith (1994),10 prior authors have not examined the extent to which 
funding status persists over time for public plans and what leads to this outcome. In the present 
study, therefore, we investigate in more detail the links between past and current funding ratios.  
Second, our particular interest is in examining the links between plan funding and governance 
structure, taking into account investment performance. Our panel data set offers an insight into 
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behavior through time, enriching findings from the predominately cross-sectional studies in the 
literature.   
The econometric model posits that three dependent variables are of most interest: a plan’s 
stock funding ratio, its flow funding ratio, and its investment performance. To understand how 
funding outcomes in public pension plans are developed via the actuarial evaluation process, 
Figure 1 describes the key relationships between dependent variables. At time t, usually in mid-
year, a public pension plan asks in-house or outside actuaries to conduct an actuarial evaluation 
on plan assets and liabilities. From these data, both the stock funding ratio in year t and the 
required contribution for year t+1 are calculated. Then, between time t and t+1, the plan sponsor 
must make contributions according to its policy. At the end of year t+1, the flow funding ratio of 
that year can be calculated from the actual and required contributions.  
Figure 1 here 
The relationships we posit among the three dependent variables of most interest may be 
clarified with the help of Figure 2.  StockFundt, FlowFundt+1 and RORt are the dependent 
variables representing, respectively,  the plan’s stock funding ratio, flow funding ratio, and 
investment performance. The specific empirical framework we estimate with the PENDAT 
information may therefore be stipulated as follows:  
tttt nCompositioStockFund 31210 RORStockFund αααα +++= −  
     1654 eXReportingManagement ttt ++++ ααα           (1)       
ttttt ManagementnCompositio 432101 RORStockFundFlowFund βββββ ++++=+                         
265 eXReporting tt +++ ββ                   (2) 
tttt ManagementnCompositioStockFund 32110ROR γγγγ +++= −  
            3654 eXInvestmentReporting ttt ++++ γγγ                              (3) 
8 
 
 
 
Figure 2 here 
Here, investment returns are hypothesized to have a positive effect on stock funding, and that, in 
turn, stock funding affects flow funding. We also hypothesize that the dependent variables are 
influenced by three types of factors: lagged dependent variables, factors representing plan 
governance, and indicators of plan investment practices.  Specifically, Compositiont, 
Managementt, Reportingt, and Investmentt variables reflect pension Board composition, 
management practice, reporting practice, and investment practice; and the Xt vector refers to 
other control variables.   
Pension liability measures used here involve the Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) 
concept, which differs from other liability measures used in past public pension studies.11  Of 
course, the choice of the discount rate used in computing liabilities plays an important role in 
funding models.12  In the PENDAT, the nominal discount rates reported range from 4.5 to 11.2 
percent, with the real discount rate from –0.22 to 7.67 percent. We follow Chaney et al. (2002) to 
adjust liabilities to a common economic discount rate.13 Again, required contributions are 
adjusted using the same approach.  
Since we postulate that the stock funding ratio can affect future flow funding ratios, the 
model is recursive and it may be estimated using pooled OLS with robust standard errors.14  In 
what follows, we first discuss the dependent variables and their lags, as well as the relationships 
between each other. Then we turn to a discussion of the remainder of the findings.  
Endogenous Dependent Variables  
 The stock funding ratio, as noted above, represents the ratio of plan assets to liabilities. It 
reflects the accumulated effects of plan contributions plus investment performance on plan 
assets, and it also reflects changes in plan liabilities. In the corporate sector, federal regulations 
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require that plan sponsors maintain full funding and boost contributions if levels go low. By 
contrast in the public sector, no such regulation is nationally mandated. As a result, public plans 
may have less incentive to fully fund, and in most cases unfunded pension liabilities can be 
amortized over future years. Hence we hypothesize that the stock funding ratio in year t will be 
positively correlated with a plan’s past stock funding ratio, which we capture through the use of 
a lagged dependent variable. 
In addition, when modeling stock funding patterns, we must recognize that investment 
returns can also influence plan funding levels.  For example, state and local governments have 
historically tended to prohibit managers from investing in what were perceived to be “risky” 
assets, including equity, venture capital, and foreign holdings. In the early 1990s, for instance, 
public plans were still found to hold more conservative assets than private plans, and hence they 
earned returns below those of market indices (Mitchell and Hsin, 1997). Over the 1990s, 
however, the PENDAT file reveals that public plans gradually increased their equity holdings 
(from around 35 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000). Naturally, holding more equities means 
the plan is subject to more volatile investment returns, so public pension plan funding levels are 
more sensitive to investment returns today than they were decades ago. Nevertheless, previous 
studies on public sector pension plan funding have stressed the willingness and capacity of state 
and local governments to make enough contributions, while neglecting the more and more 
important role played by plan investment performance (Epple and Schipper 1981, Mitchell and 
Smith 1994, Copley et al. 2002).  In what follows, the empirical model allows investment returns 
to be determinative of pension funding status, and the expectation is that this relationship is 
positive.  
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 The second dependent variable of interest is the flow funding ratio, which reflects how 
well a plan meets its annual contribution requirements, as determined by plan actuaries. A 
positive link between flow and stock funding would be anticipated if a government jurisdiction 
has a persistent political climate or “culture”; thus one might expect “behavioral persistence” 
with respect to funding, which would indicate a positive and possibly unitary relationship 
between actual and stock funding measures. An alternative hypothesis would be that state and 
local governments would seek to balance actual and required contributions, but they might not 
necessarily do so over a period as short as one year. In this case, the long-term relationship 
between stock and flow funding would reflect “mean reversion;” that is, a period of flow 
underfunding would be followed by one of overfunding. One prior study sought to differentiate 
between these hypotheses using cross sectional 1989 data for 42 plans, and it concluded 
behavioral persistence dominates; i.e. that there is a positive relationship between stock and flow 
funding ratio (Mitchell and Smith, 1994).  We also test the hypothesis using our larger and 
longitudinal dataset. 
  The third dependent variable of interest is the plan’s investment performance, measured 
here by rates of return reported on pension investments.  Clearly high investment returns are 
preferred, other things equal, since they enable the plan to maintain funding while avoiding extra 
contributions. In addition, we also are aware that past funding behavior might affect a pension 
plan’s investment strategy. For one thing, a well-funded pension plan may be more able to bear 
investment risk than a poorly funded plan, since the stronger plan has more of a buffer to 
withstand a bear market. From this logic, one might expect a positive link between the plan’s 
lagged funding ratio and its current investment return. Alternatively, an underfunded pension 
might invest in riskier portfolios, in the hopes of improving its asset base. In this latter case, we 
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would expect lagged stock funding to be inversely related to current investment returns. Below 
we will explore which prediction is supported empirically. 
Explanatory Variables 
 Because public plans are responsible for so many participants and such a large pool of 
investment funds, analysts have recently become interested in how such pensions are governed. 
Governance refers to “the systems and processes by which a company or government manages 
its affairs with the objective of maximizing the welfare of and resolving the conflicts of interest 
among its stakeholders” (Carmichael and Palacios, 2003).  In practice, state and local retirement 
systems are run by a retirement Board that has authority over investments, actuarial valuations, 
system operations, and often plan benefits as well. Day-to-day administration is usually managed 
by the retirement system's staff (Mitchell et al. 2000). In the US, public plans exhibit great 
diversity in their governance structures: some funds include active participants, while others 
have only appointed Board members; some plans have annual reporting requirements, while 
others do not; and some are subject to statutory investment restrictions, while others have more 
freedom. In our empirical models, we measure plan governance along three dimensions: Board 
composition, management practices, and reporting practices. 
  Board composition practices are proxied by the percentage of employees on public 
pension Boards, which prior analysts have suggested may reduce stock funding and investment 
performance (Mitchell and Hsin, 1997).  Here we disaggregate further to ask whether having 
active versus retired members has a differential impact. Most likely, plan participants will be 
more concerned with their benefits and push for better funding, than would politically affiliated 
members such as appointed and ex-officio representatives. On the other hand, Mitchell (1988) 
suggests that Board members who are not financially expert may find it difficult to monitor plan 
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performance, in which case having more active or retired members may permit lower funding. 
Which effect dominates is an empirical matter to be explored.  The composition of the pension 
Board may also influence investment performance. Previously studies have found mixed results 
on this point, with no statistically significant impact discerned in cross sectional data by Useem 
and Mitchell (2000), but a negative impact of retiree Board members on returns in Mitchell and 
Hsin (1997). We hypothesize that having more participants on the Board may lead to lower 
returns due to a more conservative approach to investments.15 
  To evaluate plan management practices in public pensions, we control on expense ratios, 
defined as the sum of administrative and investment cost over total plan assets; these would be 
expected to have a negative impact on stock funding.  Some 43 percent of plans in the sample 
also have reciprocal agreements with other retirement systems, permitting transfers or service 
credits earned elsewhere. Such portability would be anticipated to have a negative influence on 
public plan stock funding, as indicated by Mitchell and Hsin (1997).  Another factor 
distinguishing plans is where the funds come from to cover contributions; for a quarter of our 
sample, states or cities have dedicated special taxes to cover plan contributions. It is possible that 
this approach enhances funding, since the plan enjoys a stable income source rather than being 
influenced by variable state or local government revenues. In this case, having a special tax may 
be positively tied to better funding. On the other hand, a state or local government might fail to 
fill contribution gaps if it depends on a dedicated income stream to meet contribution 
requirements. Our analysis investigates the links between special taxes and plan funding ratios 
empirically. Additionally, in many public pension plans the Board of Trustees influences 
actuarial assumptions used in setting plan funding levels. One key factor is the amortization 
period for past service liabilities: having a longer amortization period reduces the level of 
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required contributions, thus making it easier for employers to meet annual contribution 
requirements. We hypothesize a positive link between the assumed amortization period and flow 
funding levels. 
 States and localities have developed alternative approaches to solving the principal-agent 
problem arising from the fact that the plan’s Board of Trustees acts as the agent for the 
principals, who are taxpayers and plan participants. One concern mentioned by Hess and 
Impavido (2003) is that trustees might act in their own self-interest or may simply shirk their 
duties. Another is that public sector trustees may seek to use fund assets to further the social or 
political goals of the party in power. Clearly it is critical to effectively and efficiently monitor 
plan Trustees, which is likely to be facilitated if annual reports are provided containing financial, 
actuarial, statistical, and investment information. For this reason we hypothesize that annual 
reporting practices should positively influence both funding ratios and investment performance. 
We also find it useful to control the practice for whether trustees are covered by liability 
insurance, since private insurers may monitor plan investment behavior in lieu of effective 
oversight and reporting. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that having liability insurance might 
increase moral hazard if trustees feel they can invest less prudently when covered. Which effect 
dominates empirically is explored below.  
 Plan reporting practices can be very important to pension plan investment outcomes. This 
is evident, in some cases, where plans engage independent entities to evaluate pension 
investment performance. The argument is that, when well done, independent performance 
evaluation can improve plan investment performance by introducing best-practice management 
techniques. Additionally, outside evaluation can boost information flows to taxpayers and plan 
participants, enabling them to better monitor Board behavior. While independent performance 
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evaluations are expected to enhance pension investment returns, previous literature has provided 
little hard evidence supporting the supposition: Mitchell and Hsin (1997), as well as Useem and 
Mitchell (2000) did not find a link between performance reviews and pension plan investment 
returns.  We revisited these findings using our decade-long sample of pension plan performance 
and structure. 
 We also take note that plan investment practices can play a critical role in influencing 
pension plan outcomes. Except liability insurance mentioned above, another aspect of investment 
practices is an indicator of socially-targeted investments. These refer to investments where social 
development targets are included as well as risks and returns.  Such targeted investments can 
reduce plan investment performance, if the level of portfolio diversification decreases.  Prior 
studies reported a negative link between investment directed in-state and one-year investment 
returns (Mitchell and Hsin 1997) though others argue that such policies do not hurt investment 
performance (Munnell and Sunden 2001). A recent study on this topic, Coronado et al. (2003), 
found some evidence that in-state investment and country/industry restrictions have a negative 
influence on public sector plan investment performance, although these results are relatively 
weak. In our study, we hypothesize that the higher the fraction of plan assets which are directed 
in-state, the lower will be the plan’s investment returns. Due to the fact that markets rose 
substantially over the 1990s, the regressions also control both stock market performance (proxied 
by S&P 500 returns), and plan asset allocation (proxied by proportions of assets invested in 
stocks and international assets), to accurately measure how plan governance influences on 
investment performance. 
 In addition to the plan structure variables described above, we also control on several 
other factors recommended by prior studies.  For instance, facing budget shortfalls can produce 
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fiscal distress, which translates into lower pension plan contributions.16 Three studies have 
proxied fiscal distress by the deviation between a state’s recent unemployment rate and its long-
term average (Mitchell and Smith 1994, Mitchell and Hsin 1997 and Johnson 1997); prior results 
show that above-average unemployment is associated with lower public pension funding. Using 
a different measure of stress, Chaney et al. (2002) found that state budget deficits reduced 
pension funding outcomes. Below, we predict that fiscal distress negatively affect funding ratios.  
This may be aggravated when a state has a balanced-budget requirement, as per Mitchell and 
Hsin (1997) and Chaney et al. (2002). That is, the funding status of state pension plans might be 
inversely related to the existence of a balanced budget requirement because such requirement 
tends to enhance borrowing from trust funds, like pension funds, according to the GAO (1985).  
In what follows, we control on whether states have a balanced budget requirement or whether 
they can carry over imbalances. Finally, our multivariate analysis controls on pension plan size, 
on the grounds that scale economies are important in public pension system (Mitchell and 
Andrews, 1981).  
 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Most of the variables we use are drawn directly from the PENDAT survey files which 
reported public retirement system and plan practices regarding administration, membership, 
benefits, contributions, funding, and investments. In addition, three variables are derived from 
outside sources, namely indicators of fiscal stress, budget carry-over practice, and stock market 
returns. As an indicator of fiscal stress we use “Unempd,” which is the deviation of the local 
unemployment rate from the long-term average. We use “Nocarry” as an indicator that the state 
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is permitted to carry over a budget deficit from one year to the next. We also control on the 
aggregate S&P 500 level, to proxy for market-wide stock market performance.17 
 Table 3 presents our main empirical results, pooling data on all available plans over the 
period 1990-2000.18  Equation (1) focuses on the stock funding ratio, where we see that higher 
investment returns are positively related to stock funding outcomes. Specifically, if investment 
returns rise by 1 percentage point, stock funding rises by 0.42 percentage points. This positive 
and large association explains why public plan funding in the 1990s was so strong, but it also 
helps understand why public plan funding rates declined when the market turned down in 2000.   
Table 3 here 
 We also find that stock funding patterns are positively correlated over time, confirming 
the behavioral persistence hypothesis. This is partly due to the fact that there is no uniform 
public plan funding regulation, as there is for private pension plans under ERISA. Nevertheless, 
stock funding ratios across years are not perfectly correlated, so that one-percentage point higher 
stock funding in one year is associated with 0.76 percentage point greater funding the following 
year.  In other words, on average, public plans do make an effort to fill in an underfunding gap 
over time, though not fully from one year to the next. 
Governance variables such as Board composition are also found to play an important role 
in determining plan funding status. The results suggest that, other things equal, having more 
participants on the Board, either retired or active plan members, is associated with lower levels 
of public plan stock funding. The coefficients are strong and negative: the point estimates 
indicate that adding 1 more active plan member on Board decreases stock funding by 0.7 
percentage point, and 1 more retired member will decrease stock funding ratio by 1.7 percentage 
points. These findings are consistent with the magnitudes reported by Mitchell and Hsin (1997). 
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Management practices are also influential: having a dedicated tax for contributions 
appears to reduce, rather than enhance, funding. This may be because state or local governments 
may assume that such taxes cover needed contributions so that they do not fill the gap when one 
arises. This contrasts with Mitchell and Hsin (1997) who found that funding did not respond to 
having a dedicated tax; however their data were cross-sectional and did not control on lagged 
dependent variables.  We find no evidence in Table 3 that fiscal distress due to unusually high 
unemployment rates prompts public employers to underfund their pension promises. This result 
is consistent with the study of Mark (1997) who also finds no direct link, but contrasts with 
Mitchell and Hsin (1997), Johnson (1997) and Chaney et al. (2002), who do report a negative 
link between government fiscal distress and pension underfunding.  Further, the data reveal no 
significant effect of having budget non-carryover requirements for stock funding, consistent with 
Bohn and Inman (1996) and Mitchell and Hsin (1997). Our results do contrast with Chaney et al. 
(2002), whose research is cross-sectional and does not control on the endogenous effect of 
investment performance and governance practice as we have.  
 Equation (2) explores the determinants of flow funding, where we see a positive 
association between current flow funding and past stock funding patterns. Nevertheless, this 
relationship is not one to one; when stock funding ratio increases one percentage point, the flow 
funding ratio rises by only about half a percentage point. Hence, the “behavioral persistence” 
hypothesis cannot be rejected consistent with Mitchell and Hsin (1997), and the point estimates 
suggest that persistence is attenuated by “mean reversion” effects.  Since there is no additional 
tie between investment performance and flow funding, we conclude that flow funding responds 
to stock funding, rather than current investment performance. It is interesting that having more 
retirees on the Board is associated with lower flow funding patterns, but having active 
18 
 
 
 
participants is not statistically significant.  Once again, having a special tax dedicated to 
contributions reduces flow funding, as was true for stock funding. While many of the other 
control variables are not statistically significant (fiscal stress, plan size, and budget carry-over 
policy), we do find that plans reporting a longer amortization period are more likely to report 
higher flow funding, consistent with our earlier discussion. 
 Equation (3) focuses on the determinants of investment performance. Here we see that 
the lagged funding ratio is not statistically significant, holding constant portfolio mix and other 
factors. On the other hand, the composition of the pension Board does have an effect on pension 
investment performance: specifically, yields are significantly lower when retiree representation 
increases, which confirms findings in Mitchell and Hsin (1997). This could be due to the lack of 
expertise of retired participants in investment decision-making. We also find that pension 
reporting practices have a potent effect on investment returns. For instance, having an annual 
report is positively and significantly associated with investment returns, and the effect is large: 
annual returns are almost 2.1 percentage points higher for plans providing annual reports 
containing financial, actuarial, statistical, and investment information. This may be due to the 
mitigation of information asymmetry, which helps stakeholders monitor trustees more 
effectively.  
 Our study also confirms that some pension investment practices are influential in plan 
performance. There is a negative link between economically targeted investments (when assets 
must be directed in-state) and plan investment returns but the effect is not statistically 
significantly different from zero, consistent with a recent study by Munnell and Sunden (2001), 
but in contrast to earlier analysis by Mitchell and Hsin (1997). Greater concentration of the 
portfolio in stocks (or international equity) had a positive (negative) association with pension 
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investment returns, holding constant market performance (proxied by S&P 500 returns). A one 
percentage point rise in the S&P 500 was associated with higher public sector pension annual 
investment returns of 0.42 percentage points.   
 Table 4 summarizes our main empirical results, focusing only on statistically significant 
and interesting relationships in the context of current economic conditions.  All estimates hold 
other factors constant at their mean values. One provocative finding is that a 30-percent drop in 
the S&P 500 index, such as was experienced during 2000-2002, would be predicted to cut public 
pension investment returns by 12 percentage points. Given that the real annual return over the 
prior decade averaged less than 8 percentage points, this is a substantial impact.  A large drop in 
investment returns would also depress stock funding: a 20 percentage point change in one-year 
returns would cut the stock funding ratio by 8 percentage points.  Turning to the stock funding 
ratio, Nesbitt (2003) reported a 24 percentage point drop between 2000 and 2002; according to 
our model, this would decrease the flow funding ratio by 11 percentage points. Governance 
changes could also have an important effect: for example, adding one more active plan member 
to a Board would be predicted to lower a plan’s stock funding ratio by 0.7 percentage points. 
Adding a retired member would decrease the stock funding ratio by 1.7 percentage points, drop 
flow funding by 2.3 percentage points, and cut annual investment returns by 0.4 percentage 
points.  Finally, holding all else equal, issuing an annual report with financial, actuarial, 
statistical, and investment information would boost a plan’s annual investment returns by 2.1 
percentage points.19  
Table 4 here 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusions 
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Prior studies on public pension plan performance did not take into account the possibility 
that pension funding and investment performance may be endogenously determined, and that 
funding patterns may be linked over time. This paper explores both possibilities, and also it 
examines the links between plan funding and governance structure, taking into account 
investment performance. Our longitudinal data set offers a view of behavior across years, 
enriching findings from what have been mainly cross-sectional analyses in prior literature.   
The results suggest that investment performance positively influences stock funding 
ratios in public sector pension plans, and stock funding ratios in turn positively affect flow 
funding ratios. In addition, plan funding status tends to be positively correlated over time, 
confirming that there is behavioral persistence in pension manager behavior. Supportive of 
previous research, we find that public plan governance has an important impact on plan 
investment performance and funding status. Having more retired employees on the Board can 
depress investment performance, stock funding, and flow funding, while having more active 
employee participation can depress stock funding. Regarding management and investment 
practices, we confirm that having a special dedicated tax does not enhance funding. Investment 
practices also have an important impact on plan investment performance, as does plan 
transparency. When a plan reports its financial, actuarial, statistical and investment information, 
that plan is more likely to have higher investment returns.  
Our research is particularly timely in view of the fact that global capital markets are 
experiencing some of the strongest shocks of the last half-century. The S&P 500 index dropped 
by around 30 percent between 2000 and 2002; our estimates suggest that a 30 percent drop in the 
S&P 500 index would be predicted to depress public plan investment returns by 12 percentage 
points, while a 20 percentage point drop in plan investment return would depress stock funding 
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ratios by 8 percentage points.  To make public plans more resilient to such shocks, plan 
governance structure could be enhanced to boost investment performance and funding status. 
One way would be to include more expert Board members; another might be to provide better 
training to Board representatives, especially if they are active or retired employees.   
There is reason to believe that these findings are also relevant for pension plans in the 
corporate pension sector. For instance, corporate accounting standards have come under heavy 
scrutiny of late (Fore, forthcoming), partly as a result of extraordinary drops in private-sector DB 
plan underfunding driven by some of the same phenomena as in the public sector. In fact, the 
abrupt global downturn in DB plan funding levels is raising questions regarding whether pension 
plan reporting and transparency in all sectors should be required to conform to new and more 
comprehensive international standards. Indeed, recent experience with public pensions does 
suggest that greater transparency could enhance both funding and investment results. Pension 
stakeholders of all stripes would be expected to benefit from more detailed and timely financial, 
actuarial, statistical, and investment information.  What the costs of such additional transparency 
might be is a topic for future research.  
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Table 1.  US Public Plan Assets, Liabilities, Funding, Contribution Patterns, and Investment 
Performance 
 
A. Public Plan Assets, Liabilities, Funding, and Contribution Patterns (in 2000 dollars) 
  1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Assets ($M)        
Mean 1,847 1,759 2,559 3,336 3,836 5,938 10,300 
Median 290 139 424 653 498 741 1,726 
Liabilities ($M)        
Mean 2,420 2,186 3,202 3,946 4,398 6,176 10,000 
Median 344 164 450 682 557 761 1,691 
Stock Funding Ratio (%)        
Mean 86.45 89.85 89.58 87.42 89.02 94.00 98.63 
Std.dev. 50.44 48.42 44.76 34.34 22.78 22.17 22.64 
Flow Funding Ratio (%)        
Mean 89.50 99.97 95.02 97.88 97.59 99.63 101.42 
Std.dev. 32.99 45.36 32.40 18.34 11.05 27.56 28.22 
Contribution Rate (%)        
Mean 12.88 13.49 13.63 13.93 12.78 11.96 11.84 
Std.dev. 9.69 9.58 10.44 10.04 9.88 8.27 10.08 
 
 
B. Investment Performance: Real Returns 
  1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
1-yr Return (%)        
Mean 2.81 11.02 5.75 -0.59 10.79 13.53 2.44 
Std.dev. 4.60 7.76 3.08 3.89 3.74 4.52 5.97 
Av. 5-yr Return (%)       
Mean 7.77 6.54 6.84 5.23 8.40 11.28 10.71 
Std.dev. 2.53 1.76 1.64 1.17 1.85 2.31 2.42 
Sample size 124 203 144 174 228 190 125 
Source: Authors’ computations using PENDAT 1990-2000; see text. 
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Table 2. Prior Research on Public Plan Funding: Summary of Empirical Findings   
 
 StockFund  FlowFund ROR 
Endogenous variables:      
    StockFund  >0 Sig: Mitchell/Smith 
(1994)   
    FlowFund    
    ROR    
Explanatory variables:     
1. Governance      
  Board Composition     
          % Active Members  <0 Sig:  Mitchell/Hsin (1997) 1 NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)  NS: Useem/ Mitchell (2000); 
Mitchell/Hsin (1997) 
         Coronado et.al. (2003)1 
          % Retired Members <0 Sig: Mitchell /Hsin (1997)  NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)  <0 Sig: Mitchell/Hsin (1997) 
NS: Useem/Mitchell (2000)        
 Management Practices     
         SpecTax NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)  NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)   
         Portable <0 Sig: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)    
        AmortPerc  NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)   
 Reporting Practices    
         Disclose NS:  Mitchell/Hsin (1997)  NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)   
         IndPerf   NS:  Useem/Mitchell (2000) 
         Mitchell/Hsin (1997)  
2. Pension Investment 
Practice  
   
         InState   <0 Sig: Mitchell/Hsin (1997); 
NS:  Munnell/Sunden  (2001);   
         Coronado et.al. (2003) 
        InvstIns >0; Mitchell/Hsin (1997)   
3. Other Controls     
      Fiscal stress <0 Sig: Mitchell/Hsin (1997);   
Chaney et al. (2002)2  
           Johnson (1997)  
NS: Mark (1997) 3 
NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997)   
       NoCarry <0 Sig: Chaney et al. (2002) 
NS: Mitchell/Hsin (1997); 
Bohn/Inman (1996)4 
NS: Bohn/Inman (1996);       
Mitchell/Hsin (1997).  
 <0 Sig: Mitchell/Smith 
(1994)   
 
        S&P500 >0 Sig: Mark (1997)    
See Appendix for variable definitions. NS means not significant. Sig means significant at least at 10 percent level. 
Notes:  
1. Mitchell/Hsin (1997) uses proportion of Board member elected by active and retired members, while we use 
proportion of Board members who themselves are active or retired plan participants. Useem/Mitchell (2000) and 
Coronado et.al. (2003) uses total Board members elected by members. 
2. Chaney et al. (2002) use the current year general fund surplus measure as the fiscal distress. 
3. Mark’s (1997) funding measure uses plan unfunded liabilities divided by plan income rather than a more 
conventional stock or flow funding measure. 
4. Bohn and Inman (1996) summarize unreported regression results in text. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Public Pension Plan Funding Status and Investment 
Performance: Pooled OLS with robust standard errors  
(std. errors in parens; hypothesized signs at the left of column results) 
 
   (1)  (2)   (3) 
  StockFund FlowFund  ROR 
Dependent Variables:       
  StockFund Stock funding ratio    ? 0.45**  
(0.15) 
  
  FlowFund Flow funding ratio       
 ROR 1-year investment return + 0.42**  
(0.12) 
+ 0.01    
(0.27) 
  
Explanatory Variables:       
1. Lagged Dependent Variable       
  StockFund Lag of stock funding ratio  
+
0.76** 
 (0.05) 
 ? -0.01     
 (0.01) 
2. Plan Governance Variables      
     Board Composition       
  Active % Active Members ? -0.06**   
(0.03) 
? 0.02    
(0.05) 
? -0.002   
(0.01) 
  Retired % Retired Members ? -0.16**  
(0.06) 
? -0.21*  
(0.13) 
? -0.03*        
(0.02) 
    Management Practices       
  Spectax Dedicated tax   ? -4.17**  
(1.23) 
? -7.60**  
(3.96) 
  
 TotalCost (Admin + invst costs)/plan assets - -1.17   
 (1.88) 
   
  Portable Employees may switch plans 
taking accruals   
- 1.98    
(1.17) 
   
  AmortPer Amortization period for past 
service liabilities 
  + 0.37**  
(0.17) 
  
    Reporting Practices       
  Disclose Annual report w/ financial, 
actuarial, statistical, and 
investment information 
+ 0.79    
(2.41) 
+ 3.95    
(4.87) 
+ 2.13**   
(1.08) 
  IndPerf Independent investment 
performance evaluation 
   + 0.14   
(0.60) 
3. Pension Investment Practices       
  InvstIns Investment decisionmakers 
covered by liability insurance 
   ? -0.56      
(0.41) 
  InState Fraction of pension investment 
directed in-state 
   - -0.89    
(0.76) 
 Stock % of assets invested in stocks     + 0.08** 
(0.02) 
 Intl % of plan assets in international 
equities  fixed incomes 
   + -0.07** 
(0.03) 
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Table 3 (cont) 
   (1)  (2)   (3) 
  StockFund FlowFund  ROR 
4.Control Variables       
  Unempd Current unemployment rate - 
previous decade unempl. 
 - -0.02 
(0.21) 
- -0.71  
(0.44) 
  
  Nocarry State law disallows carryover of 
state budget deficit 
 - -.1.85  
(1.85) 
- -4.45  
(4.40) 
  
  SP500 S&P500 return    + 0.42**   
 (0.02) 
  lnAssets log of plan assets + 0.12   
 (0.32) 
+ 0.24    
(0.77) 
+ 0.17*     
(0.09) 
           
Number of Plans 566 566  566 
R2 0.72 0.16  0.54 
 
Note:  ** Significant at 5% level 
*  Significant at 10% level 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using the PENDAT 1990-2000; see text. 
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Table 4.  Estimated Responsiveness of Key Explanatory Variables 
 
 Stock Funding 
Ratio  
Flow Funding 
Ratio 
1-yr Investment 
Return 
Capital Market & Performance 
Factors: 
    
     -30 percentage pt in S&P 500 index   -12 percentage pts 
     -20 percentage pt in 1-yr plan  
     investment return  
-8 percentage pts   
     -24% in plan stock funding ratio    -11 percentage pts  
Governance Factors    
     +1 active Board member -0.7 percentage pts   
     +1 retired Board member -1.7 percentage pts -2.3 percentage pts -0.4 percentage pts 
     Annual report issued   +2.1 percentage pts 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using the PENDAT 1990-2000; see text. 
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 Figure 1: The Actuarial Evaluation Process in Public Pension Plans 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Relationship between Public Plan Investment Performance, Stock 
Funding, and Flow Funding  
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables:    
  StockFund Stock funding ratio (%) 88.07 26.42 
  FlowFund Flow funding ratio (%) 97.96 31.69 
  ROR  Annual investment return (%) 7.90 6.93 
Explanatory Variables:    
1. Lags    
  StockFund Lag of stock funding ratio (%) 84.77 29.09 
2. Governance Structure   
     Pension Board Composition    
  Active % Active Members  51.92 24.08 
  Retired % Retired Members  11.49 11.54 
    Management Practice    
  Spectax Dedicated tax (0/1)  0.25 0.43 
 TotalCost (Admin+invest. costs) / plan assets (%) 0.48 0.61 
  Portable EEs may switch plans taking accruals (0/1) 0.44 0.50 
  AmortPer Amortization period for past service 
liabilities (number) 22.19 12.64 
    Pension Reporting Practice    
 Disclose Annual report w/ financial, actuarial, 
statistical, and investment information (0/1) 0.96 0.20 
  IndPerf Independent investment performance 
evaluation (0/1) 0.86 0.35 
3. Pension Investment Practice    
  InvstIns Investment decision makers covered by 
liability insurance (0/1) 0.49 0.50 
  InState % of pension investment directed in-state  
0.08 0.27 
 Stock % of assets invested in stocks  49.75 14.96 
 Intl % of assets invested in international equities 
and bonds 8.21 8.25 
4.Control Variables    
  Unempd Current unemployment rate - av. past 
decade unemployment rate (%) 1.14 2.80 
  Nocarry State law disallows carryover of state 
budget deficit (0/1) 0.77 0.42 
  SP500 S&P500 return (%) 14.57 11.71 
  lnAssets Natural log of plan assets ($) 12.98 2.40 
Number of Observations: 566   
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
Source: Authors’ computations using the PENDAT 1990-2000; see text. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 See, for instance, Scannell (2002), Smalhout (2003), Chernoff (2003) and Berman (2003). 
2  For example, Ohio’s public school teachers and administrators plan (STRS) required retired 
teachers with fewer than 15 years of teaching to pay their full health care premiums. In addition, 
retiree groups were unable to salvage subsidies that had traditionally been provided for teacher’s 
spouses and dependents (Warsmith 2003). 
3 Past research has shown that public employees require compensating wage differentials in 
times of more severe underfunding, which in turn drives salary pressure (Mitchell and Smith, 
1994: Inman, 1982). 
4 Young (2002) notes that inadequately funded pension plans can drag down sponsor credit 
quality.  
5  The PENDAT file is quite reflective of the national public plan universe, representing 
approximately 58 percent of all public retirement plans, 67 percent of active plan participants 
and 68 percent of all state and local retirement system assets in fiscal year 2000 (PPCC, 2002). 
Data available in machine-readable format cover years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 
2000. 
6 GASB Statement No. 27 requires public pension plans to report Actuarial Accrued Liabilities 
(AAL), with a cost method selected from a menu (e.g. Entry Age Normal, Projected Unit Credit, 
Frozen Entry Age Normal, Attained Age, Frozen Attained Age, and Aggregate, etc). On average, 
47 percent of the PENDAT public plans examined here used the Entry Age Normal cost method; 
15 percent used the Projected Unit Credit approach; and the rest used other methods.  
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7 The analysis omits six PENDAT observations with stock or flow funding ratios greater than 
500 percent; detailed evaluation of these cases suggests that such high funding ratios represent 
input error.  
8 See, for instance, Bahl and Jump (1974), Taylor (1986), Testin (1984, 1986), Testin and Snell 
(1989), and Turner and Beller (1989).  Dulebohn (1995) evaluated 205 plans in 1988 and 1992 
and concluded that public plans improved their funded status over time. More recent descriptive 
studies include Mitchell et al. (2000).   
9 Here we focus only on empirical studies on public pension plan funding.  In the literature, the 
theoretical studies on the funding of public pension plans include Mumy (1978), Epple and 
Schipper (1981), and D’Arcy, Dulebohn and Oh (1999).  
10 Mitchell and Smith (1994) evaluated only the influence of stock funding ratio on flow funding 
ratio using a single survey year (1989). Their study found a positive, strong relationship between 
stock and flow funding ratio, supporting the hypothesis of behavioral persistence.  
11 Prior to 1996, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 5 
required public plans to report both the AAL and the PBO, where PBO is a standardized measure 
calculated using projected benefit methods. From 1997 on, GASB Statement No.27 required 
plans to report only AAL measures.  Mitchell and Hsin (1997) used the Projected Benefit 
Obligation (PBO) for PENDAT information prior to 1996. Results we report below are similar if 
we use PBO funding measures for the period 1990 to 1994 only (results available on request).    
12 For instance, Winkelvoss (1993) concluded that a 1 percent point increase in the discount rate 
reduces actuarial accrued liabilities by 16 percent, and a similar point is made by the US General 
Accounting Office (USGAO, 1993). 
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13 Following Winkelvoss (1993), pension actuarial liabilities as well as normal costs are 
measured under the AAL method altered by 4 percent for each ¼ of each percent change in the 
interest rate. To adjust liabilities, to a common discount rate, we first calculate q = (reported 
discount rate - standard discount rate)/0.25, where the standard discount rate is the mean discount 
rate for each year in our sample, and then multiply the reported AAL by 1.04q. Hence if the 
plan’s reported discount rate is larger than the standard discount rate, the adjusted AAL will be 
larger than the reported one, and vice versa. In unreported regressions, we also estimate two 
alternative models: one without adjusting the discount rate, and another with the discount rate 
decided simultaneously with the stock funding ratio. The estimated coefficients are similar in 
sign and significance to those reported below.  
14 It is possible that flow funding can also influence stock funding ratios; that is, stock funding 
may be larger when flow funding ratios have been higher. We experimented with this question 
by including lagged flow funding ratios in the stock funding regressions, but the coefficients 
were not statistically significant.   In results not reported in detail here, we also re-estimate the 
model using 3SLS and 2SLS. Coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude, so in what follows, 
we simply present the pooled OLS results. As there are lagged variables in the equations, we 
tested the serial correlation in the error terms after doing the pooled OLS regression on the panel 
data as Wooldridge (2002) recommends. Since the error is a first-order autoregressive process, 
we use a robust variance matrix estimator.   
15 The education level of Board members may be positively related to their financial 
sophistication, but PENDAT contains no direct information on this point. We can test the 
hypothesis that teacher Board members are better educated than other members, by interacting 
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Board composition with a teacher plan variable; however the interactions are not generally 
statistically significant (results available on request).    
16 For instance, North Carolina’s governor suspended contributions to the state retirement system 
when faced with an impending budget shortfall in 2001 (Chaney, Copley, and Stone, 2002). 
17 Unemployment rates are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at www.bls.gov. 
Indicators of budget carry-over are taken from Bohn and Inman (1996). Annual S&P500 returns 
are derived from CRSP.  
18 Conclusions are similar if we limit the analysis only to those plans included in all years 
(results available on request). 
19 It is possible that there is some reverse causality here, which might arise if reports were issued 
only by the well-managed funds which also perform better. However, since 96% of the funds do 
issue reports, such censoring is likely to be relatively unimportant. 
